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ARTICLE

Troubled Water: An Examination of the
NPDES Permit Shield
STEPHANIE RICH
In the past three years, a series of court decisions have left
the federal circuits split over liability protection under the Clean
Water Act (CWA). The CWA contains a provision known as the
“permit shield” that protects the holder of a valid permit from
citizen suits and enforcement actions so long as the holder
complies with the provisions of its permit.1 Like much of law,
what seems to be a fairly straightforward provision has actually
given rise to enormous debate among the regulated community
and public interest groups. The issue in the recent case law
revolves primarily around what it means to comply with one’s
permit and whether a permit holder may invoke the permit shield
defense even without adequately disclosing pollutants in the
application process. Even more significant is the question of to
what extent the permit shield applies in the context of general
permits—one of the two major permits under the CWA.
In this comment I argue for a narrow interpretation of the
CWA permit shield by analyzing the recent federal cases
addressing the shield’s scope. A narrow interpretation calls for a
greater level of compliance and disclosure on behalf of the permit
holder in order to invoke the shield’s protection. This argument
also includes a higher standard of “reasonable contemplation” of
pollutants on the part of the regulator. The first section of this
comment gives a brief background of the CWA, the National
 Stephanie Rich received her B.A. from the University of Virginia in 2011
and her J.D. from the University of Richmond School of Law in 2015. She is a
member of the Virginia Bar and currently practices environmental law in
Washington, DC.
1. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 n.28 (1977).
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Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), and the
permit shield provision. The next section presents the
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) policy on the shield,
and introduces foundational case law. The comment then
provides an overview of the issues and court decisions that have
governed the recent debate over the scope of the permit shield.
Lastly, the comment considers the important implications of the
court decisions and the underlying arguments surrounding the
dispute. Ultimately, I find that a narrow construction should
apply because this interpretation adheres most closely to the
fundamental premise of the CWA—to protect the waters of the
United States.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. The Clean Water Act NPDES Permitting System
In 1972, Congress created what is commonly known as the
Clean Water Act in order to “restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”2
Congress replaced the ineffective state-based regulatory program
with a national permitting system based on federal and state
cooperation. The mechanisms to achieve the Act’s goal include: a
strict prohibition on discharges of pollutants without a permit,
technology-based pollutant controls, and state-issued water
quality standards.3 Section 301(a) of the CWA prohibits the
discharge of any pollutant by any person from any point source
into navigable waters of the United States.4 Congress created a
major exception to this strict liability standard under the CWA
with two permit programs, one of which is the Section 402
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).5
The NPDES program requires facilities to acquire a permit to
discharge pollutants from certain point sources into designated
U.S. waters.6 Congress authorized EPA or an approved state

2. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
3. Id. §§ 1311(a), 1314, 1313.
4. Id. § 1311(a).
5. Id. § 1342. The other permitting program under the CWA is in Section
404, regulating dredged or fill material. Id. § 1344.
6. Id. § 1342.
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agency to issue the permits. Currently, there are forty-six states
that have authorized state permitting programs.7
There are two main types of permits under the NPDES
permitting program—an individual permit and a general permit.8
An individual permit is one that the regulator issues to a specific
entity or source. The issuance of an individual permit requires an
informal agency adjudication process for approval in which the
permitting authority drafts a permit that is specifically tailored
to a particular facility.9 General permits, on the other hand,
cover one or more categories of discharges belonging to separate
facilities within the same geographic or political region.10 Since
1979, general permits have covered thousands of point sources
and have authorized discharges from a variety of sources,
including municipal and industrial stormwater systems and
concentrated animal feeding operations.11
The CWA states that NPDES permittees must comply with
all the relevant requirements for a discharge.12 Generally, a
NPDES permit contains five types of provisions. The first is
Technology-Based Effluent Limitations.13 These are limitations
on discharges depending on the available technology and cost.14
EPA establishes national effluent guidelines that address the
applicable limitation for certain types of facilities.15 If EPA does
not have written guidelines for a certain industry group, then a
permit writer is required to use his or her “best professional
judgment” in developing a technology-based limit.16 The second
provision in a permit is Water-Quality-Based Effluent
Limitations. These are limitations determined by the impact of a
pollutant on receiving waters and are used if the Technology-

7. Specific State Program Status, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/
npdes/basics/State-Program-Status.cfm [http://perma.cc/XR56-7DSS].
8. 40 C.F.R. § 122.21 (2015).
9. See generally OFF. WASTEWATER MGMT., EPA, WATER PERMITTING 101
(1999), http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/npdes/basics/upload/101pape.pdf [http://
perma.cc/JVU6-AXRH].
10. 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a).
11. See id. § 122.28(b).
12. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2012).
13. 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(a)(1).
14. Id.
15. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b).
16. See id. § 1342(a)(1)(B).
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Based Effluent limitations are not sufficient to meet the
applicable water quality standards.17 The permit also typically
contains monitoring and reporting requirements.18 The NPDES
permit will specify how and when a facility must perform
sampling for certain pollutants.19 Standard conditions must also
be included in every NPDES permit.20 These conditions include
requirements such as a duty to properly operate a facility, report
any anticipated noncompliance, and notify the proper authority of
any changes to the facility.21 Finally, a NPDES permit may also
contain requirements that are deemed appropriate for a specific
facility.22
In applying for an individual NPDES permit, applicants
must submit an application within 180 days of the discharge and
provide EPA or an authorized state the required information
about the facility.23 Applicants must disclose significant detail
about the pollutants the facility expects to release. Information
that is required varies depending on whether the facility is an
existing or new point source, or discharging only non-process
water.24 Generally, among the information EPA requires are
facility and receiving waters locations, the facility’s operations,
sampling of wastewater, quantitative data on the pollutants, and
a listing of all toxic pollutants.25
The application process for the general permit differs from
that of the individual permit. In issuing a general permit, the
permit writer determines whether data collected from facilities
warrants a general permit. The regulator considers whether there
are important similarities between the facilities that allow them
to operate under one permit. In making this determination, the
permit writer considers factors such as: whether the facilities
discharge the same pollutants, use similar disposal practices,
require the same monitoring, and whether it would be practical to

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. §§ 1312(a),1342(a)(1)(B); 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d).
40 C.F.R. § 122.41(l)(4).
Id. § 122.41(j).
See id. §§ 122.41–122.42.
Id.
Id. §§ 122.43(a).
Id. § 122.21(c)(1), (f).
See 40 C.F.R. § 122.21.
Id. § 122.21(g)(1), (3), (7)(i), (9).
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control the facilities under a general permit instead of an
individual permit.26 Once the general permit has gone through a
notice and comment phase, the permit writer issues the permit
with the appropriate limitations and provisions for the facilities
under the permit’s coverage.27 A discharger seeking coverage
under a general permit after the permit has already been issued,
must submit a notice of intent.28 The notice of intent must
contain information essential to implementing the program,
including the name and address of the operator and facility, the
type of facility or discharges, and the receiving streams.29 Once
the permit writer reviews the notice of intent, he or she will grant
the facility coverage under the general permit, ask for additional
information from the facility, or recommend that the facility
apply for an individual permit.30
Since the agency relies heavily on the information an
applicant provides about the nature of its discharges, “disclosures
made by permit applicants about their operations and waste
streams are critical to the success of the overall permitting
scheme.”31 Once an authorized agency reviews the permit
application for completeness and accuracy, a permit writer will
use the national effluent guidelines, the information submitted by
the applicant, and his or her experience, in drafting permits to
determine what will be listed as a pollutant and what limitations
will be set on those discharges.32
B. The Permit Shield Provision
Under the CWA, dischargers who have valid NPDES permits
and comply with the conditions of those permits are free from
enforcement actions relating to those discharges.33 This is

26. Id. § 122.28(a)(2)(i)–(ii).
27. Id. § 123.61.
28. Id. § 122.28(b)(2).
29. Id.
30. OFF. WASTEWATER MGMT., supra note 9.
31. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 7 E.A.D. 605, 619 (EAB 1999).
32. See EPA, NPDES PERMIT WRITERS’ MANUAL 3-3, (2010), https://www3.
epa.gov/npdes/pubs/pwm_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7HC-CAZ5] [hereinafter
NPDES PERMIT WRITERS’ MANUAL].
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (2012).
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referred to as the “permit shield.”34 The statute provides,
“[c]ompliance with a permit issued pursuant to this section shall
be deemed compliance, for purposes of sections [309] and [505] . . .
with sections [301], [302], [306], [307], and [403] . . . except any
standard imposed under section [307] for a toxic pollutant
injurious to human health.”35 Section 309 and 505 pertain to
state enforcement and citizen suits.36 Sections 301, 302, 306,
307, and 403 relate to standards for dischargers.37
Congress intended for the permit shield to give permittees
insulation from changes in regulations during the life of the
permit. The House Report provides: “The purpose of this
provision is to assure that the mere promulgation of any effluent
limitation or any limitation, a standard, or thermal discharge
regulation, by itself will not subject a person to holding a valid
permit to prosecution.”38 For instance, EPA will occasionally
update the effluent limitations for certain categories of
discharges.39 The shield gives a permittee protection from having
to meet more stringent requirements issued by EPA until the
permit expires or is modified or reissued.40 The provision
therefore provides some comfort to permittees as a defense
against government and citizen suit actions regarding claims a
permit is not sufficiently strict.41
Much to the frustration of the courts, the legislative history
gives no guidance as to how far the protection of the permit
provision actually reaches. Does the shield apply to pollutants not
listed in the permit? What level of disclosure by the permit holder
is required to trigger the permit shield defense? Does the shield
apply to only individual permits? In light of this statutory
ambiguity, it is appropriate to defer to the reasonable
interpretation of the agency.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id. §§ 1319, 1365.
Id. §§1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1343.
H.R. Rep. No. 92-911, at 128 (1972).
33 U.S.C. § 1311(d).
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 n.28 (1977).
See id.
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C. EPA’s Interpretation of the Permit Shield
EPA has made several policy statements on the scope the
permit shield’s coverage.42
In a 1976 memorandum, EPA
clarified that it intends for a permit to give general authorization
to discharge, subject only to the conditions and limitations
contained in the permit.43 In 1994, EPA issued a more thorough
policy document discussing the application of the shield to certain
categories of pollutants identified in the permit. These pollutants
included:
1) Pollutants specifically limited in the permit or pollutants
which the permit, fact sheet, or administrative record explicitly
identify as controlled through indicator parameters
2) Pollutants for which the permit authority has not established
limits or other permit conditions, but which are specifically
identified in writing as present in facility discharges during the
permit application process and contained in the administrative
record which is available to the public; and
3) Pollutants not identified as present but which are
constituents of wastestreams, operations or processes that were
clearly identified in writing during the permit application process
and contained in the administrative record which is available to
the public.44

EPA also noted in its 1994 policy that the shield extends to
general permits.45 The Agency stated that general permits allow
for discharges within the specified scope of the particular

42. See Memorandum from Jeffrey G. Miller, Deputy Assistant Adm’r for
Water Enf’t, to Reg’l Enf’t Dir., Region V (Apr. 28, 1976), http://www3.
epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm489.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B9Y-HEZ9]; Memorandum
from Robert Perciasepe, Steven A. Herman & Jean C. Nelson, Assistant Adm’rs
& Gen. Counsel, to Reg’l Adm’rs & Reg’l Counsels (July 1, 1994),
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm615.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZBE4-9TH8];
Memorandum from Robert Perciasepe, Steven A. Herman & Jean C. Nelson,
Assistant Adm’rs & Gen. Counsel, to Reg’l Adm’rs & Reg’l Counsels (Apr. 11,
1995), http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0131.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP9AV5CL]. It should be noted that two of these guidance documents followed shortly
after Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Eastman Kodak Co. and were in response
to some questions that were raised by the court’s holding.
43. Memorandum from Jeffrey G. Miller, supra note 42.
44. Memorandum from Robert Perciasepe, Steven A. Herman & Jean C.
Nelson (July 1, 1994), supra note 42, at 2.
45. Id. at 3.
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permit.46 EPA specified that as long as the discharger complies
with the permit conditions, including the pollutant limits,
notification requirements, and other conditions, the permit shield
will apply.47
Finally, EPA explicitly discusses three circumstances in
which the permit shield does not apply. In the case of individual
permits, an NPDES permit does not authorize discharge of
pollutants from wastestreams, operations, or processes that
“existed at the time of the permit application and which were not
clearly identified during the application process.”48 EPA states,
however, that if a permit holder makes changes to its discharges,
the shield also applies to these changes so long as the discharger
abides by the notification requirements.49
D. The Early Decisions: Atlantic States, Ketchikan, and
Piney Run
The first three major cases to address the scope of the permit
shield were the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s
Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Eastman Kodak,50 the
Environmental Appeals Board’s Ketchikan Pulp,51 and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit’s Piney Run Preservation
Association v. County Commissioners of Carroll County.52 All
three decisions granted the shield’s coverage for pollutants that
are not expressly listed in a permit. These cases serve as the
foundation for the recent and pending cases over the permit
shield, with permit holders seeking to expand the reach of their
holdings.
In Atlantic States, an environmental group filed suit against
Eastman Kodak, a company that operated a facility that
manufactured photographic products and laboratory chemicals in
Rochester, New York.53 Kodak also operated a wastewater
treatment plant that would remove harmful pollutants from the
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.41(1), 122.42(a)–(b) (1994)).
12 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1994).
7 E.A.D. 605 (EAB 1998).
268 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2001).
Atl. States, 12 F.3d at 354.
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facility before discharging them into the Genesee River.54 The
plaintiff environmental group, Atlantic States Legal Foundation,
alleged that Kodak exceeded the effluent limits in its state-issued
The group also claimed Kodak was liable for
permit.55
discharging sixteen pollutants that were not listed in its NPDES
permit.56 The court found that “[o]nce within the NPDES
scheme, polluters may discharge pollutants not specifically listed
in their permits so long as they comply with the appropriate
reporting requirements and abide by any new limitations when
imposed on such pollutants.”57 The court recognized, as EPA
addressed in its guidance policies, that it would be too restrictive
to prohibit all other pollutants not listed in the permit.58
However, the court also emphasized that full disclosure is an
essential prerequisite to allowing the permit shield defense.59
Four years later, the EPA Environmental Appeals Board
(EAB) followed similar reasoning as the Second Circuit in
Ketchikan Pulp. In Ketchikan, EPA’s Region 10 filed suit against
Ketchikan Pulp Company (KPC), a pulp mill, for having drained
a two-year accumulation of flocculant60 into Ward Cove through a
flocculant drain line.61 KPC also released untreated cooking acid
into Ward Cove.62 EPA claimed that these specific discharges
were not covered by KPC’s permit.63 KPC’s NPDES permit laid
out effluent limitations for five conventional pollutants but
nowhere did it mention limitations for flocculent, cooking acid, or
industrial spills.64
In its defense, KPC argued that the
discharges were “implicitly” covered by the permit and therefore
protected by the permit shield.65
The Board disagreed,
54. Id.
55. Id. at 355.
56. Id. at 356–57.
57. Id. at 357.
58. Id.
59. Atl. States, 12 F.3d at 358.
60. Flocculants are used in water treatment processes to help
sedimentation or filtration of small particles. See, e.g., FLOCCULANTS.INFO, http://
www.flocculants.info/ [https://perma.cc/A2DW-3QGH].
61. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 7 E.A.D. 605, 609–10 (EAB 1998).
62. Id. at 609.
63. Id. at 612.
64. Id. at 611.
65. Brief for Respondent at 11, Ketchikan Pulp Co., 7 E.A.D. 605 (EAB
1998) (No. CWA-1089-12-22-309(g)).
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emphasizing that unlisted pollutants may fall under a permit’s
coverage only if the permittee meets the Agency’s disclosure
standards.66 KPC, unlike Kodak, failed to meet EPA’s disclosure
policy.67 Here, the Board concluded, there was no evidence that
KPC disclosed its flocculent discharge practices or any
anticipated chemical spills.68 Additionally, the Board found the
permitting authority had no reason to anticipate such releases.69
In the 2001 case Piney Run Preservation, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with Ketchikan and
Atlantic States in finding that EPA’s disclosure standards were
valid.70 In Piney Run, the plaintiffs file suit against Carroll
County, claiming that the county-operated waste treatment plant
was unlawfully discharging warm water into Piney Run.71 In
Piney Run the court addressed two questions: “what comprises
the scope or terms of an NPDES permit” and “whether the permit
shield bars CWA liability for discharges not expressly allowed by
the permit when the holder has complied with the permit’s
express restrictions.”72
In examining the central issue, the court followed the
Chevron analysis and first looked to the plain language of the
statute.73 If the congressional intent behind the statute was clear
then the court would not need to conduct any further analysis.74
Section 402(k) of the CWA states, “compliance with a permit
issued pursuant to this section shall be deemed compliance. . .”75
The court agreed with Atlantic States in finding that this crucial

66. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 7 E.A.D. at 621.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 626, 632.
69. Id. at 629, 639..
70. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. Cty. Comm’rs of Carroll Cty., 268 F.3d 255,
267–68 (4th Cir. 2001).
71. Id. at 259.
72. Id. at 266.
73. Id. at 267. The court here applies step one of the Chevron analysis,
which is to first answer “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842 (1984).
74. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (“[T]he court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously express intent of Congress.”).
75. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d at 267 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k)
(2012)).
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language is ambiguous and does not explain the scope of the
permit shield.76
The court then applied step two of the Chevron analysis and
found that the EPA’s interpretation in Ketchikan was a rational
construction of the statute.77 Following the test from Ketchikan,
the court explained that “the Commissioners would be in
violation of their NPDES permit through the Plant’s discharge of
heat if either: (1) the permit specifically barred such discharges;
or (2) the Commissioners did not adequately disclose [the
discharge to the Maryland Department of the Environment
(MDE)].”78
The plaintiffs in Piney Run argued that because there was a
short footnote stating “the discharge of pollutants not shown shall
be illegal,”79 the defendant permittee had clearly violated the
terms of the statute. The court, however, was not persuaded. The
court found that there was no extrinsic evidence showing that
MDE actually intended the permit to be that strict.80 Indeed, the
court concluded that if the footnote had been that important then
the text would not have been so buried within the permit.81 As to
the second prong, the court found that there was evidence that
the Commissioners had disclosed heat discharges and that MDE
had contemplated them.82 The commissioners had informed
MDE of the heat during the permitting process and the record
contained a compilation of the daily reports on water temperature
and heat discharges provided by the Commissioners to the
MDE.83 Since the Commissioners had met both prongs, the court
ultimately held that the Commissioners were protected by the
permit shield and were not liable under the CWA.84

76. Id.; see also Atl. States Legal Found. v. Eastman Kodak, 12 F.3d 353,
357–58 (2d Cir. 1993).
77. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d at 267. Step two of the Chevron
analysis states that “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
78. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d at 269.
79. Id. at 270 (internal quotations omitted).
80. Id. at 270–71.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 271–72.
83. Id.
84. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d at 271–72.
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II. THE RECENT ISSUES
After a twelve-year lull, courts began to revisit the question
of how much protection the shield actually affords. A series of
cases from 2013 to 2015 dealt with numerous issues arising from
both the lack of clarity in the CWA provisions and industry’s
attempt to limit liability for releasing contaminants. Among the
questions presented were whether a failure to disclose a
discharge during the permitting process bars the permit shield
defense, whether failure to comply with all provisions of an
NPDES permit bars protection, and whether the shield is
available to general permits. The following section provides a
discussion of this recent case law. Note, that even though these
cases fall within such a close time period of one another, the
courts come to widely different conclusions about the application
of the shield.85
The 2013 case, Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v.
Marfork Coal, narrowed slightly the scope of the permit shield in
the context of the individual NPDES permit by finding that a
permit holder could be in violation of its permit even when there
is no effluent limitation set for the pollutant.86 In Marfork, four
environmental groups filed suit against Marfork Coal Company
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia.87 The plaintiffs claimed, among other allegations, that
Marfork violated the CWA by discharging selenium from one of
its surface mines into a nearby stream.88 Marfork’s permit
expressly limited the discharge of certain pollutants including
iron, manganese, and aluminum, but did not expressly limit
selenium.89 The court stated that, “assuming selenium was
adequately disclosed as a discharge” during the application phase
and was thus within the reasonable contemplation of the state
authority, “Marfork would not be in violation of the CWA.”90
85. Also, note that there is little reference from one court case to another
since most of the cases were pending at the same time and, therefore, had little
persuasive value to one another.
86. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Marfork Coal Co., 966 F. Supp. 2d 667,
689 (S.D.W. Va. 2013).
87. Id. at 667.
88. Complaint at 1, Marfork, 966 F. Supp. 2d. 667 (No. 5:12-1464).
89. Marfork, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 671.
90. Id. at 682.
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However, there was another relevant section in the permit
that stated “[t]he discharge or discharges covered by a
WV/NPDES permit are to be of such quality so as not to cause
violation of applicable water quality standards.”91 The court
found that the permit “explicitly authorizes the discharge of
selenium only to the extent that it does not cause a violation of
The court rejected Marfork’s
water quality standards.”92
argument that pointed to similarities between Marfork’s permit
and the permits disputed in Piney Run and Atlantic States.93
More specifically, the court discussed that the defendants in
Piney Run and Atlantic States possessed permits that implicitly
allowed discharges after they were contemplated by the
permitting authority, while the cross-reference to water quality
standards in Marfork’s permit actually contained a provision
expressly prohibiting selenium.94
In the 2014 case Southern Appalachian Mountain Stewards
v. A & G Coal, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of whether
a company’s failure to disclose the discharge of selenium barred
the shield defense.95 The defendant, A & G Coal Corp., operated
a coal mine in Wise County, Virginia and identified the surface
mine as the source of runoff to two ponds and groundwater.96
Environmental groups, including Southern Appalachian
Mountain Stewards, sampled the identified ponds and found that
they contained selenium, a chemical not listed in A & G’s
permit.97 Regulations require that for a primary industry to
discharge “process wastewater” it must report quantitative data
on pollutants, including selenium, listed in the application.98 The
applicant must notify the authorizing agency as to the presence

91. Id.
92. Id. at 685. This is a generic provision that is provided in almost all
NDPES permits.
93. Marfork raised the similarity that plaintiffs in all three cases “claimed
violations of statutory and regulatory provisions purporting to make illegal the
discharge of any pollutant not expressly allowed under the permit.” Id.
94. Id.
95. S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards v. A & G Coal Corp., 758 F.3d 560,
561 (4th Cir. 2014).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 562.
98. Id. at 563; see 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE 9 § 25-31-100(H)(7)(e)(2); 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.21(g)(7)(vi)(B) (2015).
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or absence of the pollutants on the list.99 A & G did not report
any data on selenium in its application.100 A & G claimed that
because it neither knew nor had reason to believe that the
discharge contained selenium that it complied with the
application requirements.101
The court rejected A & G’s argument that it only needed to
mention selenium if it knew or had reason to believe that the
element was present in the discharges. The court stated that A &
G’s interpretation “turns the presumptions of the CWA on their
head.”102 In its analysis, the Fourth Circuit found that A & G
failed to meet the first prong of the Piney Run test.103 The first
prong of the Piney Run test states that a permit holder may be
shielded from liability if the “permit holder complies with the
express terms of the permit and with the Clean Water Act’s
disclosure requirements.”104 In determining whether A & G met
this prong, the court considered 1) whether A & G had provided
adequate information to Department of Mine, Minerals, and
Energy (DMME) and 2) whether the selenium discharges were
within the reasonable contemplation of DMME.105 The Fourth
Circuit stated that the agency needs this information to make a
fully informed decision when issuing the permit.106 Otherwise,
the court explains, the lack of disclosure would “encourage willful
blindness by those discharging pollutants and prevents the . . .
agencies . . . from receiving the information necessary to
effectively safeguard the environment.”107 Accordingly, the court
entered judgment for the plaintiffs.108
The Ninth Circuit recently came close to ruling on whether
the permit shield applies to a general permit in the case Alaska
99. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, APPLICATION FORM 2C - WASTEWATER
DISCHARGE INFORMATION 3 (1990), http://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/3510-2C.pdf
[https:// perma.cc/F62D-VNQL].
100. S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards, 758 F.3d at 566.
101. Brief for Appellant at 21, S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards, 758
F.3d 560 (No. 13-2050).
102. S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards, 758 F.3d at 566.
103. Id. at 565–66.
104. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. Cty. Comm’rs of Carroll Cty., 268 F.3d 255,
259 (4th Cir. 2001).
105. S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards, 758 F.3d at 565.
106. Id. at 566.
107. Id. at 567.
108. Id. at 562, 570.
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Community Action on Toxics v. Aurora Energy Services.109 The
Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s holding that the
defendants were shielded from liability under the CWA for
discharging coal into Resurrection Bay.110 The Seward Loading
Facility, which is owned and operated by the defendants,
transfers coal onto ships through a conveyor system.111 The
plaintiffs alleged that the conveyor occasionally spills coal into
the bay.112 The defendants claimed that the spills were covered
by the defendants’ Multi-Sector General Permit.113 The Ninth
Circuit disagreed and found that the plain terms of the general
permit prohibit the discharge of coal.114 The court focused on the
language in the permit that required that all discharges not
authorized by a NPDES permit be eliminated.115 The court
concluded that, because the list of permissible non-stormwater
discharges did not include coal, the discharge of coal ash was a
violation of the permit.116 The court noted that it need not
discuss whether the permit shield applies to general permits, but
that if the Piney Run analysis did apply, the result would be the
same because the defendants had not complied with the “express
terms of the General Permit.”117
Shortly after the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Sixth Circuit
offered a more direct analysis of whether the permit shield
applies to the general permit.118 In Sierra Club v. ICG Hazard,
the Sierra Club filed suit against ICG’s Thunder Ridge Mine for
allegedly violating the conditions of its state-issued general
permit (KPDES permit).119 ICG, located in Leslie County,
Kentucky, discharged amounts of selenium that exceeded

109. Alaska Cmty. Action on Toxics v. Aurora Energy Servs., LLC, 765 F.3d
1169 (9th Cir. 2014).
110. Id. at 1172.
111. Id.
112. Complaint at 6, Alaska. Cmty. Action on Toxics v. Aurora Energy
Servs., LLC, 940 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (D. Alaska 2013) (No. 90CV00255).
113. Id. at 4.
114. Alaska Cmty. Action on Toxics, 765 F.3d at 1172.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1173.
117. Id. at 1173–74.
118. Sierra Club v. ICG Hazard, LLC, No. 11-148-GFVT, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 146140 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 28, 2012).
119. Id. at *4.
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Kentucky’s numeric and narrative water quality standards.120
The KPDES permit placed effluent limitations on pollutants such
as solids, iron, and manganese but did not place any limits on
selenium.121 Rather, the KPDES permit required “each existing
mining operation authorized by this general permit [to] conduct
and submit . . . a one-time analysis for . . . selenium.”122 The
Sierra Club argued that the fact that ICG’s selenium discharges
were not limited in the KPDES permit did not allow the company
The Sierra Club
to invoke the permit shield defense.123
contended that “because the permitting authority lacks detailed
information about individual discharges when issuing a general
permit, the scope of a general permit is defined by the effluent
limitations present in the permit,” and, therefore, the scope of the
permit shield for a general permit should be narrower than the
shield of an individual permit.124
The district court, however, rejected Sierra Club’s argument
and came to a different conclusion.125 The court highlighted a
major difference between an individual permit and general
permit during the application process.126 During the application
for an individual permit, the permit applicant is required to
disclose information and is at fault if the applicant does not
disclose appropriate information.127 By contrast, a general
permit requires very minimal information from the facility during
the permitting phase.128 It is the duty of the permit writer to
request any additional information.129 If that information is not
120. Id. at *6 (citing 401 Ky. Admin. Regs. 10:031 §§ 2(1)(d), 4(1)(f), (6)).
121. Id. at *11.
122. Id.
123. Id. ICG relied on the 1995 EPA Policy Statement addressing the scope
of the permit shield. See id. at *16–17.
124. Sierra Club Motion for Summary Judgment at 12, ICG Hazard, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146140 (No. 11-CV-148-GFVT).
125. ICG Hazard, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *11–28.
126. Id. at *19. The court refered to the General Permit Guidance in stating
“the only significant difference is that ‘a larger share of the responsibility for the
information gathering process leading up to the development of a general permit
falls on the permitting rather than on the permit applicants.’” Id. (quoting
OFFICE OF WATER ENF’T & PERMITS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GENERAL PERMIT
PROGRAM GUIDANCE 1, 33–34 (1988) [hereinafter GENERAL PERMIT GUIDANCE]).
127. See Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Sierra Club, at 20–21, Sierra
Club v. ICG Hazard, LLC, 781 F.3d 281 (6th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-5086).
128. ICG Hazard, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *21.
129. Id.
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sought, then it is the fault of the permit writer and the issuing
authority.130 The court turned to the language in EPA’s General
Permit Guidance, which states that after the five-part
similarity131 finding is made for the general permit, “‘the actual
development of the general permit can proceed just as for any
individual permit.’”132 Therefore, the court did not find that
different requirements of the general permit were reason to
narrow the shield, but could in fact be grounds for allowing more
leeway for permittees.133
Sierra Club appealed to the Sixth Circuit where the Circuit
affirmed the district court’s holding.134 The court first agreed
with the district court that the shield applies to the general
permit by referring to EPA’s interpretation intending for the
shield to apply to both the individual and general permit.135
Second, the court agreed with the district court that ICG’s
discharge of selenium satisfied the Piney Run test.136 The court
found that ICG had met the disclosure prong of Piney Run by
disclosing the presence of selenium with a “one-time sample at
some time during the life of the permit.”137 KDOW was also
aware that “the mines in the area could produce selenium,”
satisfying the “reasonable contemplation” prong.138 The court
cites as evidence of KDOW’s knowledge the inclusion of a onetime monitoring requirement.139 Should KDOW had found other
restrictions necessary for the release of selenium, the court
discusses, it would have included them in the permit.140
These cases present a series of highly fact-specific situations
in which the court either broadens or narrows the scope of the

130. Id.
131. The “five-part similarity” finding refers to the criteria that the
practices of the entire industry must meet in order to acquire a general permit.
40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a)(2)(i)(A)–(E) (2015).
132. IGC Hazard, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *19 (quoting GENERAL PERMIT
GUIDANCE, supra note 126, at 17).
133. See id. at *19–20.
134. Sierra Club v. ICG Hazard, LLC, 781 F.3d 281 (6th Cir. 2015).
135. Id. at 286.
136. Id. at 288–89.
137. Id. at 288.
138. Id. at 290.
139. Id. at 283.
140. ICG Hazard, 781 F.3d at 290.
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permit shield in light of those facts and the holdings in Atlantic
States, Ketchikan, and Piney Run. In examining these recent
cases together, it seems that courts may have an easier time
following the confines of Piney Run as it pertains to individual
permits. However, when applying the older cases to general
permits, the defendants’ varying circumstances raise a number of
questions for the court. The following section dissects the recent
case law and examines the underlying rationales behind favoring
a broad or narrow permit shield, especially as it pertains to a
general permit.
III. IMPLICATIONS
The recent court decisions interpreting the scope of the
permit shield raise important questions as to the purpose of the
permit shield and the consequences of the shield’s coverage. A
broad or narrow construction of the permit shield has varying
implications for industry, administrative agencies, public interest
groups, and communities. While all of the cases addressing the
scope of the permit shield rely heavily on the facts of the case,
there are some trends in the lines of argument presented by the
parties. Arguments for a broad shield focus on the notion that
permittees need certainty that they will be protected from
unlimited liability, primarily from citizen suits. These permittees
want a system that will assure their businesses the predictability
that they need to succeed. Within this same line of reasoning is
the argument that regulators do not provide notice, and therefore
violate due process, when the agency promulgates regulations
that are unclear.
While the regulated community is understandably concerned
about predictability, a narrow interpretation will provide
adequate environmental protection. The Sierra Club v. ICG
Hazard decision demonstrates the dangerous scenario in which a
company is allowed, without limitation, to knowingly discharge
one of the most toxic pollutants under the CWA. This decision,
along with many of the arguments raised by the defendants in
the recent decisions, broaden the scope of the permit shield to the
extent that it runs counter to the fundamental premise of the
CWA—to protect the nation’s waters from harmful discharges.
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A. Arguments favoring a broad scope
The regulated community has highlighted the permit shield
as a way of ensuring certainty. In a number of briefs, mining
companies underscore the purpose of the permit shield as “giving
permits finality.”141 This certainty, industry argues, reduces
unknown liability which in turn helps businesses grow. Having
the shield cover fewer pollutants, these defendants have argued,
would leave businesses guessing as to what discharges may give
rise to liability.
For instance, in Alaska Community Action on Toxics v.
Aurora Energy Services, industry associations submitted an
amicus brief arguing that Aurora’s NPDES permit barred suit for
air-borne coal dust released from the conveyor system.142 This
argument was partially based on the policy that the permit shield
“provides the finality that industry desperately needs to begin,
conduct or expand business.”143 If EPA was aware of the
incidental discharges of coal dust and the state authority
specifically authorized the coal discharges under a MSGP permit,
then how would Aurora predict liability for the discharges? The
companies urge that this uncertainty “arising from the inability
to rely upon” the whole suit of permits necessary to operate poses
significant new hurdles for “moving forward with investments to
create and expand an enterprise.”144 Permit holders argue that
this unpredictability would lead to reduced investments in
projects because investors would see more risk in a permit that
does not shield liability.145 Furthermore, banks may be more
reluctant to extend credit to such projects or would extend credit

141. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 138 n.28 (1977).
142. See Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants, Alaska Cmty.
Action on Toxics v. Aurora Energy Serv., LLC, 765 F.3d 1169 (2014) (No. 1335709); see also Crowell-Moring, LLP, Coal Loading Facility and Railroad Win
Federal Court Endorsement of Clean Water Act’s “Permit Shield” Defense and
Refusal to Expand Clean Water Act to Wind-Borne Dust, martindale.com (Apr.
11,
2013),
http://www.martindale.com/environmental-law/article_CrowellMoring-LLP_1752044.htm
[http://perma.cc/E5DF-Y3DV]
(discussing
the
implications of the district court’s holding).
143. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants, supra note 142, at
11.
144. Id. at 26.
145. Id.
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at higher interest rates.146 This loss of financing could result in a
decrease in employment and slower economic growth for
communities.147
The defendants’ arguments in Southern Appalachian
Mountain Stewards v. A & G Coal Corp. (SAMS) also urged that
the narrowing of the permit shield could give rise to unknown
liability.148 Following SAMS, if a permittee learns of a pollutant
that it “either knew or had any reason to believe that the element
would be present in its discharges” at the time that it submitted
its permit application, the permittee must immediately report it
in order to avoid liability.149 Before SAMS, this only applied to
those permittees who were making changes to their facilities.150
Also, as a result of SAMS, it is clear that a permittee cannot rely
on an authority’s awareness of a discharge or wastestreams of
which a pollutant is a constituent element, unless the permit
holder can show that it adequately investigated and tested the
specific chemical levels and disclosed these test results to the
permitting agency.151
Along similar lines, industry raises the issue of “lack of
notice” with the shrinking of the permit shield and how this
narrow scope ultimately violates the fundamental right to due
process. This is first raised in Piney Run.152 The Due Process
clause of the Fifth Amendment states, in relevant part, “[n]o
Person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.”153 Because a business may be deprived of its
146. The amicus brief contends that banks may respond to increased
uncertainty by “rationing” credit, which, they argue, could lead to “a complete
loss of access to the credit market for some project proponents” or could halt
some projects altogether. Id. at 27.
147. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants, supra note 142, at
25–30.
148. See Brief of Appellant at 3, S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards v. A &
G Coal Corp., 758 F.3d 560 (4th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-2050).
149. S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards, 758 F.3d at 566.
150. District Court Exposes Vulnerability in Clean Water Act Permit Shield,
WARREN ENVIRONMENTAL COUNSEL
LLP (July
31, 2013), http://
warrenglasslaw.com/district-court-exposes-vulnerability-in-clean-water-actpermit-shield/ [http://perma.cc/SB7D-7BPX] (discussing the implications of the
District Court’s ruling that was later affirmed by the Fourth Circuit).
151. Id.
152. See Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant at 16–17, Piney
Run Pres. Ass’n, v. Comm’r of Carroll County, 268 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2014).
153. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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property or liberty through a violation of agency regulations,
courts frequently examine whether an agency gave fair notice to a
regulated entity.154
In Piney Run, an amicus brief in support of the defendants
referred to the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in General Electric v. EPA in
which the court found that fair notice is not provided unless a
regulated entity, acting in good faith, is able to identify with
“ascertainable certainty” the standards with which the agency
expects it to conform.155 A regulation denies due process “if it is
so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as
to the conduct that prohibits” it.156 In Piney Run, the defendants
claimed that they were denied due process because there was no
temperature limitation on any publically owned treatment facility
in Maryland and neither EPA nor the Maryland Department of
the Environment had ever found the defendant permittees in
violation of their permit for discharging heat.157
Another issue that these recent cases have raised is the
burden of having to disclose many pollutants in order to be
covered by the permit shield. The CWA defines the term
“pollutant” very broadly.158 In Piney Run, the court wrote, “this
definition is extremely broad, covering innumerable individual
substances.”159 One amicus brief submitted by the industry
groups in support of the defendants in Piney Run writes that, as a
practical matter, it would be impossible to disclose every
pollutant in an effluent.160 The brief highlights that this is the
154. See, e.g., United States v. Cinergy Corp., 623 F.3d 455, 458–59 (7th
Cir. 2010) (holding that a defendant in compliance with regulations as codified
cannot be found in violation of the Clean Air Act where EPA proposes an
amendment to the regulations to prohibit defendant’s conduct); Howmet Corp. v.
EPA, 614 F.3d 544, 553–54 (D.C. Cir. 2010); United States v. Trident Seafoods
Corp., 60 F.3d 556, 559 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he responsibility to promulgate clear
and unambiguous standards is on the [agency]. The test is not what [the agency]
might possibly have intended, but what [was] said. If the language is faulty, the
[agency] had the means and obligation to amend.”).
155. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant at 17–18
(citing General Electric Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
156. Id. at 17 (citing Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966)).
157. Id. at 18.
158. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2012).
159. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. Cty. Comm’rs of Carroll Cty., 268 F.3d 255,
271 (4th Cir. 2001).
160. Amicus Brief in Support of Defendant-Appellant at 22, Piney Run
Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d 255 (Nos. 00-1283 & 00-1322).

21

RICH - FINAL

2016]

4/26/2016 1:43 PM

TROUBLING WATERS

271

case partly because facilities cannot control all water that runs on
and off of its site.161 Some of these pollutants occur naturally,
such as selenium.162 In fact, the brief argues, even if a facility
discharged distilled water, there would still be some traces of
pollutants the facility could not control.163 The court in Atlantic
States made a similar conclusion in noting that there is “no
principled reason why water itself, which is conceded to be a
chemical, would not be considered a ‘pollutant’ under . . . the
Act.”164
This unknown liability is an extremity that EPA tried to
avoid in its creation of the NPDES permitting system. The
government quickly realized that asking industry to only comply
with the parameters of a permit made facilities too susceptible to
litigation because “anybody seeking to harass a permittee need
only analyze that permittee’s discharge until determining the
presence of a substance not identified in the permit.”165 Under
the Refuse Act, the government aggressively filed suits against
polluters by constantly expanding what qualified as a pollutant
and would bring suits based on “technical violations” of the
permit.166 EPA therefore rejected this approach under the Refuse
Act permitting system.167 Despite this change in policy, the
recent court interpretations of the permit shield could arguably
“expose permittees to untold liability and largely vitiate the
CWA’s permit shield protection for the majority of NPDES permit
holders.”168
EPA has also acknowledged this argument in its guidance
policy, stating that it is impossible to identify and limit every
chemical present in a discharge.169 Furthermore, the EAB noted
in the Ketchikan decision that the “goals of the CWA may be more
161. Id. at 23.
162. Id. at 22.
163. Id. at 24.
164. Atl. States Legal Found. v. Eastman Kodak, 12 F.3d 353, 357 (2d Cir.
1993).
165. Memorandum from Jeffrey G. Miller, supra note 42, at 2.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Richard Davis & Mackenzie Schoonmaker, The Fourth Circuit Limits
the Clean Water Act’s Permit Shield Defense, BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND, PC (July
15, 2014), http://www.bdlaw.com/news-1619.html [https://perma.cc/ZE4W-PL6J].
169. Memorandum from Jeffrey G. Miller, supra note 42, at 2.
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effectively achieved by focusing on the chief pollutants and
wastestreams established in effluent guidelines and disclosed by
permittees in their permit applications.”170
From an
administrative standpoint, it would therefore be infeasible to
“contemplate” every pollutant that could possibly be present in a
discharge. In drafting a permit, the permit writer must conduct
all of the steps mentioned above171 while thoroughly documenting
his or her decision-making process.172 If a permit writer must
examine and draft limitations for hundreds of pollutants, this
could create more room for error in a process that is already
considered to be quite tedious. It would be infeasible, even with
unlimited resources, to set limitations for so many pollutants.
B. A Narrow Interpretation of the Permit Shield Should
Control
Although the permit shield is meant to give some relief to
industry, it should still be viewed within the context and purpose
of the CWA—to restore and maintain the physical, chemical, and
biological integrity of the nation’s waters.173
A narrow
interpretation of the permit shield aligns closely with this
underlying premise because it encourages careful and full
disclosure of pollutants and compliance with one’s permit. Based
on the recent case law, a narrow interpretation includes requiring
that permittees comply with all conditions of their permit in order
for the shield to apply, requiring full disclosure at the beginning
of a permit’s issuance, and raising the bar for what is deemed
“reasonable contemplation” by the agency. The following
discussion provides the basis for these requirements and
responses to the regulated community’s concerns.
First and foremost, the permit shield should not extend to
those who do not comply with all permit conditions (not simply
effluent limitations). In Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v.
Marfork Coal Co., the defendant mining company attempted to
persuade the court that it should be afforded the permit shield
even though the coal mine’s discharges of selenium violated state
170.
171.
172.
173.

Ketchikan Pulp Co., 7 E.A.D. 605, 618 (EAB 1998).
See supra Part I(B).
See NPDES PERMIT WRITERS’ MANUAL, supra note 32, at 3-3 to -5.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
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water quality provisions.174 This argument implies that even if
the permittee passes the Piney Run test, the permittee is free of
liability despite having violated another condition of the
permit.175
Another problem with allowing a permittee to claim the
permit shield defense in the Ohio Valley situation is that the
permittee would not have to report compliance with all provisions
in a permit.176 Instead, the permittee would only have to report
the effluent limits because no other condition in the permit would
be enforceable.177 There are many terms and conditions in a
permit that are not part of the effluent limitations and are
essential to safeguarding the environment.178 Not allowing the
enforceability of these conditions would be inconsistent with
federal case law that finds all terms and conditions of a permit to
be enforceable.179 Furthermore, since provisions like water
quality standards would not be enforceable, citizens would be
prohibited from bringing enforcement actions when a permittee
violated such provisions.180 The court’s refusal to grant the
permit shield defense in Ohio Valley will encourage permit
holders to comply not only with the effluent standards in a
permit, but any other conditions that are cross-referenced in the
permit.
With respect to the first prong under Piney Run, a narrow
interpretation raises the standard for what is deemed to be full
and honest disclosure of an applicant’s discharges. This
interpretation is best demonstrated by the court’s refusal to grant
174. 966 F. Supp. 2d 667, 676 (S.D.W. Va. 2013).
175. Id. at 677.
176. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23–24, Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. Inc. v.
Marfork Coal Co., 966 F. Supp. 2d 667 (S.D.W. Va. 2013) (No. 5:12-01464).
177. Id. at 24.
178. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.41 (2015). In addition to these federally required
provisions, state permits adopt provisions that may be even stricter than those
designated by the EPA.
179. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp.,
204 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that plaintiff citizen groups had standing
to sue defendant facility for discharging pollutants into a lake and that
defendant was liable for not complying with all provisions of its permit); Sierra
Club v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 847 F.2d 1109 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding that the
defendant manufacturer failed to comply with all provisions of its NPDES
permit).
180. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 176, at 18–24.
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the permit shield defense in SAMS v. A & G Coal Corp. The
Fourth Circuit’s reading of the “know or reason to believe”
provision requires that applicants affirmatively state whether
they know of the presence of a pollutant.181 Accordingly, an
applicant may not plead ignorance by failing to test for a
regulated pollutant and then simply not provide any information
regarding that pollutant because the applicant has “no reason to
believe” of its presence.182
The decision in SAMS is significant because it recognizes the
burden that the CWA places on an applicant to make an honest
inquiry into the pollutants listed in the regulations. If the court
had accepted A & G’s argument it would have extended the
permit shield to permit holders who assumed a more passive role
Instead, by taking a narrow
in the disclosure process.183
interpretation of the permit shield, the court establishes that the
permit shield should only be available to those who follow permit
requirements and who put forward the adequate disclosures
necessary for the permitting authority to reasonably contemplate
the threat of a pollutant to the environment.
In the context of the general permit, arguments embracing a
narrow shield apply the appropriate timing and standard for
“reasonable contemplation” under the second prong of the Piney
Run test. The Fourth Circuit held in Piney Run that discharges
not within the reasonable contemplation of the permitting
authority during the permit application process . . . do not come
within the protection of the permit shield.”184 The timing for the
application process differs for the individual and general permit.
In the context of the general permit, the application process
occurs before the issuance of the general permit, not when a
permit applicant submits an NOI for coverage.185
The relevant time period for the application process is
significant because it determines whether a pollutant was
181. S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards v. A & G Coal Corp., 758 F.3d 560,
567 (4th Cir. 2014).
182. Id. at 569.
183. Id.
184. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. Cty. Comm’rs of Carroll Cty., 268 F.3d 255,
268 (4th Cir. 2001).
185. Texas Indep. Producers & Royalty Owners Assoc. v. EPA, 410 F.3d
964, 978 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding the notice and comment phase the “application
process” of the general permit).
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reasonably contemplated by the agency in the issuance of the
permit. In Aurora Energy Services, EPA submitted an amicus
brief arguing that the district court had wrongly considered
Aurora’s submission of its NOI as the permit process.186 EPA
explains that the NOI is not an application, but rather an
administrative requirement.187
Unlike the issuance of the
general permit itself, the NOI does not undergo public notice and
comment. Thus, any disclosures made during the NOI phase
cannot be deemed within “the reasonable contemplation” of the
permitting authority. For a court to hold to the contrary would
encourage permit holders to make disclosures during the NOI
phase and then claim protection by the permit shield even if these
pollutants are not actually covered by the general permit.188
Tying in closely with the issue of timing, courts should also
refrain from extending the permit shield to companies that do not
provide sufficient information for a pollutant to be within the
contemplation of the permit authority. In comparison to what was
originally established by the Fourth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit in
ICG Hazard lowered the standard of proof for what is “reasonably
contemplated” by the agency.189 Piney Run and EPA have firmly
established disclosures must be adequate for the regulator to
determine whether or not there is a threat posed by the release of
a pollutant.190 In ICG Hazard, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a
one-time sampling requirement and the Kentucky Division of
Water’s “knowledge” that mines in the area could produce
selenium was sufficient to show that KDOW had “reasonably
contemplated” the release of selenium.191 However, there was no
evidence that ICG had disclosed the presence of selenium when
the general permit was issued.

186. Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 25–
39, Alaska Cmty. Action on Toxics v. Aurora Energy Servs., LLC, 765 F.3d 1169
(2012) (No. 13-35709), 2014 WL 1319629, at *25–39.
187. Id. at 35.
188. Id. at 38.
189. See Sierra Club v. ICG Hazard, LLC, 781 F.3d 281, 283, 290 (6th Cir.
2015).
190. See Piney Run Pres. Ass’n v. Cty. Comm’rs of Carroll Cty., 268 F.3d
255, 268 (4th Cir. 2001); Memorandum from Robert Perciasepe, Steven A.
Herman & Jean C. Nelson (July 1, 1994), supra note 42, at 1–2.
191. ICG Hazard, 781 F.3d at 283, 290.
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Following the low standard of “contemplation” set forth in
ICG Hazard, mines that operate under general permits may
avoid disclosing the presence of toxic pollutants in their
discharges. The permit holder would only need to show that there
was some scintilla of evidence that the permitting authority had
reason to know permittees in the region could possibly release the
pollutant. This is a significantly lower standard than in Piney
Run in which the defendants provided a “significant compilation
of the daily reports” to the permitting authority that contained
information on the pollutant at issue in the case.192 Going
forward, courts should follow Piney Run more closely so there is
further incentive for permit holders, even those operating under
the general permit, to provide detailed disclosures to the agency.
Permit holders who are not forthcoming about the nature of their
discharges to the extent that the permitting authority cannot
assess the threat to the environment, should not satisfy the
“reasonable contemplation” prong of the Piney Run test.
Industry’s fear of “untold liability” and loss of business over
the unavailability of the permit shield is an outdated argument.
It would make little sense for a citizen or regulator to bring an
action against a permit holder because they are discharging nonhazardous pollutants. The obvious disincentive for a regulator is
time and resources. As has been noted, “the Agency has
determined that the goals of the CWA may be more effectively
achieved by focusing on the chief pollutants and wastestreams
established in effluent guidelines and disclosed by permittees in
their permits.”193 For citizens, the disincentive is a court’s
stringent requirements for standing. In making a motion for
injunctive relief, a citizen must show that he or she has suffered
irreparable harm from the violation.194 Such restraints would
limit authorities and citizens from bringing frivolous lawsuits
only to harass regulated entities.
Instead of urging the courts to expand the scope of the permit
shield, the most logical recourse for industry is to be meticulous
in disclosing all hazardous pollutants so they are “reasonably
contemplated” by the regulator. Following Ohio Valley, Aurora
Energy Services, SAMS, and ICG Hazard, mines and other
192. Piney Run Pres. Ass’n, 268 F.3d at 271.
193. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 7 E.A.D. 605, 618 (EAB 1998).
194. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 541 (1987).
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regulated entities must closely review all provisions of the
NPDES permit application in order to ensure they provide
answers to all the questions that have been asked by the
regulatory agency. Otherwise, applicants risk not putting their
entire discharge within the “contemplation” of the agency. This is
a positive outcome for citizens who want to encourage permit
holders to be more thorough in their application process.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the permit shield is meant to be an exception to the
strict liability of the CWA, it must still be viewed in light of the
overall purposes of the statute—to protect the quality of U.S.
waters. The above discussion shows that a narrow interpretation
of the permit shield provides incentive for permit holders to
strictly comply with the terms of their permits and to fully
disclose their discharges so they are within the contemplation of
the permitting authority. This interpretation does not neglect
industry. Industry is still afforded great protection from the
permit shield and continues to benefit from its reassurances. It is
the role of the courts and federal and state agencies to continue to
clarify the nuances in the CWA, while citizens continue to enjoy
and protect our most valuable resource.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss2/3

28

